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1 Introduction
Monetary policy in the euro area has long been challenged by financial, economic and insti-
tutional heterogeneity among member countries. Although over time there has been some
convergence in financial markets, the convergence process has slowed down markedly since
the financial crisis (see ECB, 2017). Other markets have remained remarkably different across
member countries. Most notably, the institutional backgrounds in labour and housing are
highly dissimilar across the currency block.
Two longstanding questions are to which extent these differences in institutional back-
grounds imply a heterogeneous transmission of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) com-
mon monetary policy and, in particular, which specific institutional characteristics drive the
observed heterogeneity. These questions are of first-order importance from a policy perspec-
tive.1 Naturally, the ECB would benefit from knowing how national policies and reforms of
the institutional framework in a particular economy affect monetary transmission. At the
same time, national policy makers would gain from understanding the implications of their
policies and reforms for the transmission of monetary policy.
In this paper, we investigate heterogeneity in the transmission of monetary policy across
the euro area (EA) using a dynamic factor model (DFM), and take a first step towards
relating the observed heterogeneity to cross-border differences in institutions and markets.
We assemble a large dataset including economic and financial time series for the EA as a
block and for the 11 original member countries, spanning the years from 1999 to 2016. The
high dimensionality of the data allows us to carry out a formal comparison of the degree of
heterogeneity among responses to monetary policy shocks across different dimensions of the
economy, such as output and asset prices, as well as housing and labour markets. To identify
monetary policy shocks, we construct an external instrument using high-frequency changes
in asset prices around ECB policy announcements, following the contributions by Gurkaynak
et al. (2005) and Gertler and Karadi (2015). Comparing country-specific institutional char-
acteristics in national housing markets as a case study, we show that these characteristics are
strongly correlated to the strength of the housing channel in monetary policy transmission.
Our main results are as follows. First, at the aggregate EA level, we find that the factor
model results are in line with theory and, notably, that the transmission of monetary shocks
does not suffer from the price puzzle. Second, we show that the estimated country-level
effects are significantly heterogeneous in prices and variables related to labour and housing
markets—some of the least integrated markets in the euro area. The degree of heterogeneity
1The early policy and empirical debate on this issue is summarized by Angeloni et al. (2003), see also
Berben et al. (2004).
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among responses to policy is instead low in financial variables and output. Third, we use our
comparative analysis of European housing markets to show that the strength of the housing
channel is correlated with differences in home ownership rates, which, as we argue, reflect
different institutional characteristics across euro area countries.
On methodological ground, the paper’s main contribution lies in the construction of the
external instrument series, which we base on changes in the 1-year Euro Overnight Index
Average (EONIA) swap rate (i.e. the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rate for the euro area)
around policy announcements. In doing so, we overcome major data availability issues by
combining intraday data with end-of-day data from different timezones, creating de-facto
intraday series where actual intraday data is unavailable.2 This solution for the construction
of our instrument is not only mechanically feasible, but also economically meaningful, as it
highlights the implications of using various means of policy communication—press releases,
press statements and Q&A sessions—for the transmission of current and expected future
policy. The approach helps us to create a broad measure of monetary policy surprises that
incorporates all of the communication channels above. Finally, we test for the relevance of
the series in a small VAR, confirming its validity as an external instrument. At the time
of writing and to the best of our knowledge, there are very few attempts to construct an
external instrument for EA monetary policy.3 A notable exception is Jarocinski and Karadi
(2018). In contemporaneous work, these authors use the high-frequency co-movement of
interest rates and stock prices around a narrow window of the policy announcement to
disentangle policy from information shocks. Notably, the effects of the monetary shocks we
identify in this paper are close to the effects of policy shocks (as opposed to information
shocks) documented by these authors.
Our second contribution is motivated by the need to test heterogeneity in the responses
of economic variables to a common shock. For each set of impulse responses (e.g. GDP
across member countries), we calculate the coefficient of variation statistic, also known as
relative standard deviation. The coefficient of variation for a variable is defined as the stan-
dard deviation of responses across countries with respect to the EA response, normalised by
the size of the EA response. This yields a statistical measure of the dispersion of impulse
2Intraday data on EONIA swaps is only available for recent years. However, we were able to combine end-
of-day data from Tokyo and London to create a de-facto intraday series that goes back to the introduction of
the euro. We then compared a narrowly constructed instrument over a sub-sample for which we had complete
intraday data with our proposed de-facto intraday series. We find that the series are not significantly different
for the sub-sample. See Section 2.3.1 for details.
3Limitations on the availability of data are a strict constraint to construct this instrument for the euro
area. Some work, such as Kim and Other (2017), resorts to daily data. However, as the resulting windows
around policy announcements become very large, they are more likely contaminated by shocks other than
those stemming from monetary policy. Notably, European data is frequently released on the morning of a
policy meeting, leading to a systematic disturbance of instruments that rely on daily data.
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responses which allows us to carry out comparisons across variables. We employ a boot-
strapping procedure to obtain error bands for the coefficient of variation of each variable as
well as pairwise differences across variables.
In specifying our empirical model, we build on two strands of the literature. The first is
factor modelling, which has emerged as early as the 1970s4 and was more recently popularised
for monetary policy analysis by Bernanke et al. (2005). These authors model macroeconomic
interaction with a factor-augmented VAR (FAVAR) that combines factors and perfectly
observable series, typically interest rates, in one dynamic system. As a special case of
FAVARs, dynamic factor models (DFMs) only contain unobservable factors. Among other
applications of DFMs, Stock and Watson (2012) use this approach to disentangle the channels
of the 2007-09 recession.
From an applied perspective, the prime advantage of a factor approach5 is its ability to
keep track of individual country-level responses to a common monetary policy shock without
heavy parameterisation. Looking at the alternatives, country-by-country VARs incur the
cost of heavy parameterisation, while a large panel VAR (PVAR) with all countries imposes
restrictions on the individual dynamics. The dynamic factor model solves both problems and
provides dynamic effects on the individual countries—including net spillovers—while keeping
the parameter space small. In addition, the assumptions on the information structure in the
dynamic factor model naturally fit the EA setting. The ECB follows not only a large number
of euro-wide series but also series in individual member countries. Hence, an empirical model
with a small number of variables that does not include country-level data is unlikely to span
the information set used by the ECB.6
While we closely follow the methodology of Stock and Watson (2012) when we construct
our DFM, we bridge the approach with developments from the literature on high-frequency
identification and external instruments. As is well known, estimations of monetary policy
transmission suffer from an identification problem. One common way to overcome this
problem and identify monetary policy shocks is to impose additional internal structure on
the VAR, such as timing or sign restrictions. Alternatively, one can add information from
outside of the VAR, termed an external instrument approach. We make use of the latter.
The two leading examples of existing external instruments for monetary policy shocks in the
US are the Romer and Romer (2002) instrument based on a narrative approach, and the
4see Stock and Watson (2016) for a comprehensive exposition of factor models, including their early
history.
5see e.g. Giannone et al. (2005), Bernanke et al. (2005), Stock and Watson (2005) and Forni and Gambetti
(2010).
6Other seminal contributions on dynamic factor modelling include Sargent and Sims (1977), Sargent
(1989), Giannone et al. (2005) and Boivin and Giannoni (2007).
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high-frequency approach by Gurkaynak et al. (2005). For the second, the key idea is that
by choosing a narrow time window around policy announcements, any surprises occurring
within the window are most likely only associated with monetary policy shocks. The idea
to use high-frequency changes in asset prices, specifically interest rate derivatives, has also
been developed by Kuttner (2001), Hamilton (2008) and Campbell et al. (2012).7 Building
on these contributions, Gertler and Karadi (2015) identify monetary policy shocks in a VAR
using high frequency changes in Fed funds futures. This paper builds a hybrid between the
high-frequency identification proposed by Gertler and Karadi (2015) and the dynamic factor
model of Stock and Watson (2012).
The analysis of the housing channel conducted in our paper is related to Calza et al.
(2013), who studied how heterogeneity in the structure of housing finance across member
countries in the euro area can affect the transmission of monetary policy to house prices.
Differently from their work, we take a more comprehensive approach and, specifically, doc-
ument how differences in home ownership rates are closely linked to asymmetries in house
price responses. Moreover, we investigate the role of rents in the housing channel and show
that together with house prices, they have a strong link to responses in consumption. More
generally, our work is related to the large body of policy and academic research that, given
the importance of the topic, has been devoted to the heterogeneous transmission of monetary
policy across EA member states. Among the leading examples are Ciccarelli et al. (2013),
who look at heterogeneity from the perspective of financial fragility, as well as Barigozzi
et al. (2014) who, similar to the methodology followed in this paper, rely on a factor model,
although identifying shocks with sign restrictions and pursuing a less comprehensive study,
both in the number of variable included and the methodological and empirical questions
addressed.
In the next section, we describe the methodology used in the empirical analysis and
provide details on the external instrument used for the identification of monetary policy
shocks. In Section 3, we present our results, tracing out the effects of monetary policy on
the EA as a whole, as well as on individual member countries. Section 4 uses the housing
market as a case-study to uncover how institutional differences are affecting the monetary
transmission across the euro area. Section 5 concludes.
7Further applications of high-frequency identification in the context of monetary policy can be found
in Hanson and Stein (2015), Nakamura and Steinsson (2013), Bagliano and Favero (1999), Cochrane and
Piazzesi (2002), Faust et al. (2004) and Barakchian and Crowe (2013), among others.
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2 A Dynamic Factor Model for the EA
We begin by motivating the use of a dynamic factor model for the EA and laying out the
empirical framework. Later in this section we provide details about the external instrument
we construct to identify monetary policy shocks. At the end of the section, we discuss the
large data set and estimation.
2.1 Motivation
Given the EA setting, we are fundamentally interested in studying the effects of a com-
mon monetary policy shock on the EA as a block and on its individual member countries.8
Recovering both the effects on the block and on member countries imposes some empirical
challenges and trade-offs. On the one hand, fully recovering the effects of monetary policy
on each individual member country comes with heavy parameterisation. On the other hand,
reducing the parameter space by imposing restrictions prevents us from studying the full
width of heterogeneous effects. In addition, a small data sample in the time dimension, as
encountered in the context of the EA, further increases the acuteness and relevance of this
trade-off.
We propose a dynamic factor model for the EA as a parsimonious way to avoid heavy
parameterisation while keeping track of individual country responses to the common mon-
etary policy shock. The dynamic factor model allows us to capture dynamic effects on
individual countries through unobservable common components. The dimensionality reduc-
tion achieved through the factor model allows us to get statistically robust dynamic effects
on the individual countries while keeping the parameter space small.
The dynamic factor model has another set of appealing features for the EA. Firstly, we
can relax the informational assumption that both the ECB and the econometrician perfectly
observe all relevant economic variables. Secondly, as the ECB monitors a large number of
indicators in the process of policy formulation, including on country level, it is necessary for
the econometrician to take account of the same information set. The DFM achieves this.
Finally, the dynamic factor model provides a format that is consistent with economic theory.
We next address each of these points.
In using a dynamic factor model we do not have to take a stand on specific observable
measures corresponding to theoretical concepts. This point was convincingly put forward
by Bernanke et al. (2005). In the EA context, this relaxation becomes more relevant as it is
harder to find observable Eurowide variables—often weighted averages of individual member
8A similar setting would appear if one was simultaneously interested in the effects of monetary policy on
the U.S. as a whole and at the individual State level.
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countries—that correspond to concepts of economic theory. For example, the concept of
economic activity in the EA may not be perfectly measured by taking a weighted average of
real GDP across countries, given compositional changes that cannot be captured by treating
the EA as a single economy in a theoretical model.
The European Central Bank follows not only a large number of eurowide series but also a
large number of individual member countries’ series. Hence, an empirical model with a small
number of variables that does not include country data is unlikely to span the information
set used by the ECB. This naturally motivates the inclusion of country-level series in our
analysis.
The state-space representation of the dynamic factor model also provides a clear link
with economic theory, which creates the opportunity to formally test different mechanisms
aimed at explaining the dynamic effects found in this paper. Moreover, given the large
size of dynamic effects found in observables, it is possible to test interactions of different
mechanisms using the same model and dataset.
There are alternatives to the DFM approach chosen by us—notably Panel VAR and
Global VAR models. Both of these approaches involve restricting or explicitly modelling
the dynamics through which variables in different units affect each other. These restrictions
come at a cost of higher parameterisation relative to the dynamic factor model. Given that
we are not explicitly interested in these interaction at the cross-sectional level, but rather
in the final net effect, we choose the dynamic factor model for efficiency gains. Ciccarelli
et al. (2013) provide a further insightful discussion of the differences between these three
approaches.
2.2 Empirical Framework
We consequently use the DFM to model macroeconomic interaction. In doing so, we largely
follow the methodology proposed by Stock and Watson (2012).
Given a vector of n macroeconomic series Xt = (X1t, ..., Xnt)
′ we first model each series as a
combination of factors and idiosyncratic disturbances:
Xt = ΛFt + et, (1)
where Ft is a vector of unobserved factors, Λ is an n × r matrix of factor loadings and
et = (e1t, ..., ent)
′ denotes a vector of n disturbances. We can interpret ΛFt as the ‘common
component’ of Xt, whilst et is the ‘idiosyncratic component’. The evolution of factors is
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characterised by the following VAR:
Ft = Φ1Ft−1 + Φ2Ft−2 + ...+ ΦsFt−s + ηt, (2)
which can be rewritten with lag-operator notation as
Φ(L)Ft = ηt, (3)
where Φ(L) is a p × r matrix of lag polynomials and ηt a vector of r innovations. This
equation characterises all dynamics in the model. As it stems solely from the interaction of
factors, there is no need to model the co-movement of observed variables, hence avoiding the
curse of dimensionality.
The static factors can be estimated by suitable cross-sectional averaging. Whilst a setup
with multiple factors and general factor loadings does not allow for simple cross-sectional
averaging to produce a consistent estimate of the factors, the idea can be generalised using
principal components analysis. Given large n and T , the principal components approach
estimates the space spanned by the factors, even though the factors themselves are not
estimated consistently. Put differently, Ft is estimated consistently up to premultiplication
by an arbitrary nonsingular r × r matrix. The resulting normalisation problem can be
resolved by imposing the restriction that Λ′Λ = Ir. Given that this restriction is chosen
arbitrarily, the factors cannot be directly interpreted in an economic sense. For most parts,
we will work with the reduced-form DFM, making the normalisation inconsequential.
More generally, principal component analysis provides the factors that explain the most
variation in the data, while at the same time avoiding an information overlap between the
factors as they are orthogonal to each other.
2.3 Identification
This section turns to the identification of the monetary policy shocks in the DFM. As is well
known, estimations of monetary policy suffer from an identification problem, as monetary
policy contemporaneously reacts to other variables in the model. To find the part of the
variation in monetary policy that is orthogonal to other variables, various approaches have
been proposed in the literature. In traditional VAR-type models, researchers have typically
imposed some internal structure on the coefficients in the VAR, such as timing restrictions
or sign restrictions. More recently, Montiel Olea et al. (2012) as well as others have proposed
an additional method, where information from outside the VAR is used to identify monetary
policy. In the so-called external instrument approach, an instrument is employed that is
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correlated with the structural shock that the researcher tries to uncover, while being uncor-
related with all other shocks in the system. This corresponds to the standard assumptions
of relevance and exogeneity in the instrumental variables literature.
The main concept behind using an external instrument is that when regressing the VAR
innovations ηt on the instrument Zt, the fitted value of the regression identifies the structural
shock—up to sign and scale. In fact, as this approach uncovers the covariance between ηt
and Zt, a regression of the instrument on the VAR innovations would equally uncover the
structural shock.
Following the VAR literature and the notation in Stock and Watson (2012), we model a
linear relationship between the VAR innovations ηt and the structural shocks t:
ηt = Ht = [H1 · · ·Hr]

1t
...
rt
 , (4)
where H is a matrix of coefficients and H1 is the first column of H. It follows that Σηη =
HΣH
′, with Σηη = E(ηtη′t) and Σ = E(t
′
t). If the system is invertible—a standard
assumption in the VAR literature—structural shocks can be expressed as linear combinations
of innovations:
t = H
−1ηt. (5)
The main interest in the DFM, as in other VAR-type models, lies in uncovering impulse
response functions (IRFs) to a specific shock. To find the impulse response function of Xt
with respect to the ith structural shock, we can use equations 3 and 5 to get
Ft = Φ(L)
−1Ht. (6)
Substituting 6 into 1, we find that
Xt = ΛΦ(L)
−1Ht + et. (7)
where the IRF is ΛΦ(L)−1H. Λ and Φ(L) are already identified from the reduced form,
equation 2, which we can estimate via ordinary least squares. However, this leaves the iden-
tification of Ht, which is dealt with in the next section.
As mentioned above, we identify the shock of interest, say 1t, using the instrumental variable
Zt. The necessary conditions are:
8
1. Relevance: E(1tZt) = α 6= 0
2. Exogeneity: E(jtZt) = 0, j = 2, ..., r
3. Uncorrelated shocks: Σ = D = diag(σ
2
1
, ..., σ2r),
where D is an r × r matrix. The last condition is the standard structural VAR assumption
that structural shocks are uncorrelated. This assumption does not fix the variance of shocks.
From equation 4 we get
E(ηtZt) = E(HtZt) = (H1 · · ·Hr)

E(1tZt)
...
E(rtZt)
 = H1α, (8)
where the last identity follows from the relevance and exogeneity conditions. It follows that
H1 is identified up to scale and sign by the covariance between the VAR innovations and the
instrument. To identify the shocks themselves, we need the third condition on uncorrelated
shocks. It implies that we can rewrite the varianance-covariance matrix of ηt as
Σηη = HΣH
′ = HDH ′. (9)
Moreover, defining by Π the matrix of coefficients from the population regression of Zt on
ηt, the fitted value of this regression is
Πηt = E(Ztη
′
t)Σ
−1
ηη ηt, (10)
which, using equation 8 and 9, can be written as
E(Ztη
′
t)Σ
−1
ηη ηt = αH
′
1(HDH
′)−1ηt. (11)
By simplifying and using equation 5, we obtain
αH ′1(HDH
′)−1ηt = α(H ′1(H
′)−1)D−1t. (12)
Finally, we note that H−1H1 = e1, where e1 = (1, 0, ..., 0)′, which implies that
α(H ′1(H
′)−1)D−1t = (α/σ21)1t = Πηt. (13)
This conforms with the original statement that the fitted value of a regression of the in-
strument on the innovations, i.e. Πηt, identifies the structural shock 1t up to a constant.
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For additional intuition, Stock and Watson (2012) point out that if the structural shocks
t were observable and we could hence regress the instrument on the structural shocks, the
predicted value would again uncover the shock 1t, up to scale, as the coefficients on all other
elements of t would be zero. This follows from the relevance and exogeneity conditions
of the instrument. Equation 13 shows that the projection of Zt on ηt provides the exact
same result, uncovering 1t. Note that to estimate the structural shock, we use the sample
analogue of the above equation.
2.3.1 Instrument - “Scripta Volant, Verba Manent”9
To obtain an instrument that fulfills the necessary requirement of only being correlated with
the monetary policy shock, we build a new series of high frequency surprises around ECB
policy announcements. A similar approach has previously been proposed for US monetary
policy by Gertler and Karadi (2015). The key idea is that by choosing a narrow time win-
dow around policy announcements, any surprises occurring within the window are most
likely only associated with monetary policy shocks. Put differently, the assumption is that
no other major structural shocks occur during the chosen window around the policy an-
nouncement. Correspondingly, all endogenous monetary policy, i.e. all expected monetary
policy, is assumed to already have been priced in before the window starts. Consequently,
endogenous monetary policy would not cause a change in the instrument at the time of the
announcement.
For the instrument we choose changes in the 1-year Euro Overnight Index Average (EO-
NIA) swap rate. The logic goes that while expectations about future policy rate changes
are already priced in, unexpected policy shocks will cause the swap to appreciate or depre-
ciate instantly. If market participants, for example, expect a hike in the policy rate by a
certain amount, the announcement of such a hike will not cause the 1-year EONIA swap
rate to move. However, should a hike or cut be out of line with expectations, the swap rate
will adjust as soon as the announcement is made. Similarly, any policy action that changes
expectations about future rate movements—often termed ‘forward guidance’—will have an
impact on the swap. Lloyd (2017a) and Lloyd (2017b) demonstrates that 1 to 24-month
Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) rates accurately measure interest rate expectations. As our
chosen EONIA swap rate is the corresponding OIS rate for the euro area, this finding is di-
rectly applicable to our instrument, allowing us to capture not only current monetary policy,
but also expectations about the future path of monetary policy.
9The original quotation (Verba volant, scripta manent), attributed to Caius Titus, roughly translates as
“spoken words fly away, written words remain.” We find that, on the contrary, it is often the spoken word
of the ECB President during the press conference and Q&A session, which has a larger impact on markets
than the written word of the monetary policy press release.
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When deciding on the tenor of the EONIA swap, two considerations have to be taken
into account. Firstly, to capture how a monetary policy shock affects interest rates across the
whole yield curve, a longer dated swap is better suited compared to one with a shorter tenor.
On the other hand, however, term premia play a larger role at longer horizons, potentially
contaminating the information about future short rates. In dealing with this trade-off, we
choose the 1-year rate, based on the observation that 1-year rates are highly sensitive to
monetary policy, while still remaining relatively unaffected by term premia. That said, we
also construct instruments based on 3-month, 6-month and 2-year EONIA swaps and do not
find a significant difference in our results.
For their high frequency analysis of US monetary policy, Gertler and Karadi (2015) choose
a window of 30 minutes around the policy announcement (starting 10 minutes before the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcement and ending 20 minutes after). The
main policy announcement of the FOMC contains a large amount of information about the
decision as well as the view of the committee about the state of the economy and expectations
of future policy action. This means that within the 30 minute window, the market can fully
integrate recent policy changes and adjust the price of the instrument. The procedure of
policy releases is somewhat different at the ECB. The release of the monetary policy decision
at 13:45 CET only contains a limited amount of information on the latest policy actions. A
significant amount of information is disseminated to the market at a later stage, through the
press conference and Q&A with the President, starting at 14:30 CET. For this reason, we
decided to extend the window for our analysis to cover not only the prime release, but also
the press conference. Specifically, we choose a 6-hour window from 13:00 to 19:00 CET.10
Figures 1 and 2 show examples of characteristic movements in the 1-year EONIA swap on
ECB meeting days, highlighting the importance of including the Q&A in the high-frequency
window. On 5 June 2008, the Governing Council of the ECB decided that policy rates will
remain unchanged. As this was in line with market expectations, the 1-year EONIA swap
rate did not move much in reaction to the press release at 13:45 CET. During the press
conference however, the president expressed concern about increased risks to price stability,
10The press conference typically lasts for only one hour, implying that the window could be more narrowly
defined, ending, e.g. at 16:00 CET. We chose not to do so due to data availability issues. Specifically,
intraday data on swap prices on Bloomberg are available only from January 2008 onwards. In other words,
we would have been able to create an instrument only from 2008 using intraday data. For a window from
13:00 to 19:00 CET, however, this problem does not arise as these times correspond to the closing times of
the Tokyo and London stock exchanges, respectively. Hence it is possible to obtain end-of-day data, which is
available from 2001, and create a de-facto intraday window from 13:00 to 19:00 CET. For the subsample of
overlapping observations (2008-2016) we tested for the difference in using the window ending with the press
conference vs. later the same afternoon and found it to be statistically insignificant.
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Figure 1: 1-year EONIA swap rate on 5 June 2008. Horizontal axis shows Central European
Time (CET). Source: Bloomberg, authors’ calculations.
setting expectations of rate hikes in the near future. In reaction to this information, the
swap rate immediately jumped higher and over the afternoon increased by 27 basis points.
This example clearly demonstrates that information about ECB policy information can to
a large degree be contained in the press conference, compared to the policy announcement.
An example where both the original announcement, as well as the press conference convey
substantial information to market participants is the meeting on 6 October 2011. The press
release once again stated that rates would remain unchanged. However, this was not in
line with market expectations for a cut and hence created a tightening surprise that led to
an immediate increase in the 1-year EONIA swap rate. During the press conference, the
then ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet re-emphasised that inflation rates had remained
at elevated levels. This in turn pushed market expectations towards tighter monetary policy
and caused a further jump in the swap rate. Naturally, there are also examples where the
press conference does not convey a significant amount of information to the market, but the
above cases highlight the need to include the press release in the high-frequency window.
The above discussion raises the question to which degree the various forms of information
dissemination could be used to develop a more differentiated understanding of the nature of
policy shocks. Previous contributions have suggested a separation of monetary policy instru-
ment shocks from monetary policy communication shocks, sometimes also termed target and
path shocks. For the euro area, work on this distinction is being pursued by Jarocinski and
Karadi (2018). For the purpose of our paper, we want to use a broad measure of monetary
policy shocks that encompasses all forms of surprises, whether they are to the instrument or
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Figure 2: 1-year EONIA swap rate on 6 October 2011. Horizontal axis shows Central Euro-
pean Time (CET). Source: Bloomberg, authors’ calculations.
expectations. That said, we hope that the development of our instrument is informative for
future research on the manifold nature of monetary policy shocks within the euro area.
As we estimate a quarterly VAR, we have to turn the surprises on ECB meeting days
into quarterly average surprises. In practice, we first calculate the cumulative daily surprise
over the past quarter (93 days) for each day in our sample. In the next step we take the
average of this daily cumulative series over each quarter. In doing so, we incorporate the
information that some meetings happen early within a quarter while others happen later.
Our averaging procedure makes sure that a surprise happening late in the quarter has less
influence on the quarterly average than a surprise at the beginning of the quarter.11
To get a better understanding of the instrument, we plot its values in Figure 3. In par-
ticular, we want to point out events that led to particularly large positive or negative values
in the instrument to develop an intuition regarding the behaviour of the series. Proceeding
chronologically, the earliest of the four largest surprises happened in the fourth quarter of
2001, with a value of -0.15. This data point is driven by the aggressive interest rate cut on 17
September 2001, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.12 The ECB cut all three interest
rates by 50bp leading to a drop in 1-year EONIA swaps of 20bp during our window. Another
particularly large negative shock appears in the fourth quarter of 2008. The value of -0.17 is
mostly driven by the monetary policy decision on 2 October 2008. Interest rates were kept
11A similar approach was taking by Gertler and Karadi (2015) to create monthly FOMC surprises.
12Note that the surprise actually happened in the third quarter of 2001. However, because our averaging
approach takes into account whether a shock appears early or late in a quarter—and consequently, whether
it has a larger influence on the current or the next quarter—the policy decision from 17 September 2001
mostly affects our instrument during Q4 2001.
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Figure 3: Instrument - Quarterly 1-year EONIA swap rate surprises from 2001Q1 to 2016Q4
unchanged on the day, in line with expectations. However, President Trichet highlighted
financial market turmoil and weakness in the EA economy during his statement, leading to
a large drop in the swap rate between 14:30 and 15:30 CET as markets priced in future cuts
to the policy rate. In the following quarter, Q1 2009, our instrument records a particularly
high reading of 0.14. This goes back in large part to a contractionary monetary policy sur-
prise during the meeting of 4 December 2008, but also to a surprise during the meeting of
15 January 2009. Interestingly, during both meetings, which happened at the height of the
financial crisis, interest rates were cut—by 75bp and 50bp, respectively. While this led to
momentarily lower swap rates on both occasions, rhetoric during the press conference led to
further increases in the rate. In fact, on both occasions, the President’s various dovish and
hawkish comments led to the rate moving up and down, but the contractionary sentiment
dominated overall. Finally, we investigate the events driving our instrument during Q3 2011.
The negative value of -0.22—the largest value in absolute terms during our sample period—
mainly goes back to the policy decision on 4 August 2011. After an interest rate hike at the
previous meeting, policymakers left interest rates unchanged on the day. As this was in line
with expectations, the swap rate did not move at 13:45 CET. During the press conference,
however, the ECB announced the decision to conduct a liquidity-providing supplementary
longer-term refinancing operation (LTRO), based on observed tensions in financial markets
within the euro area. This policy action amounted to a large dovish surprise and 1-year
EONIA swaps fell by about 18bp between 14:30 and 15:30 CET.
Finally, we test the strength of our instrument. We do so in a small VAR containing only
14
three variables: output, consumer prices and a policy indicator. The model is specified both
at monthly and quarterly frequency and is identified using high-frequency instruments based
on 3, 6 and 12-month EONIA swaps. We report further details and all results in Appendix
B, but note here that in our baseline specification the instrument is strong, with a first-stage
F-test statistic of 19.45. This confirms the relevance of our external instrument.
2.4 Data and Estimation
Our data set consists of quarterly observations from 1999 Q4 to 2016 Q4 on 90 area-wide
measures such as prices, output, investment, employment and housing, as well as 342 indi-
vidual country time series for the 11 early adopters of the Euro: Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. The
vintage of the data is June 2017. Appendix C lists all data series with detailed descriptions
and notes on the completeness and length of the individual series.
All data series are transformed to induce stationarity. Depending on the nature of the
data, this was done either by taking the first difference in logs or levels. Details on transfor-
mations can also be found in Appendix C. As we lose one observation by differencing, our
working dataset starts in 2000 Q1.
Principal component analysis is sensitive to double-counting13 and we consequently only
use a subset of our data for factor extraction. In practice, we avoid double-counting along
two dimensions. Firstly, we do not include euro area aggregates for indicators where we have
included all individual country series. Secondly, we do not include category aggregates, such
as GDP, when we have included its components, such as the components of GDP. Where
possible, we avoid using high-level aggregate series altogether and instead include disaggre-
gate series. In total, we use 179 series for factor extraction.
We rely on a number of specific tests and information criteria to determine the number of
common factors r. Specifically, we estimate them by means of the test proposed by Onatski
(2009), which suggests r ∈ 2, 3 (Table 1), the eigenvalue difference method proposed by
Onatski (2010) suggesting r = 2, the criterion by Bai and Ng (2002) suggesting r = 5, and
the bi-cross-validation method proposed by Owen and Wang (2015)14 suggesting r = 8. We
choose as our baseline specification r = 5, that is, the average of these results. Figure 13 in
Appendix A shows the variance of the data explained by each additional factor. Five factors
account for 80% of the total data variance.15
13see e.g. Stock and Watson (2012).
14see Figure 12 in Appendix A.
15As can be seen in Figure 13, the bulk of the variance in the data is explained by the first two factors.
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Table 1: Determining the number of common factors: Onatski (2009) test. The Table shows
p-values of the null of q0 common shocks against r0 < r ≤ r1 common shocks.
r0 vs r0 < r ≤ r1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0.727 0.089 0.122 0.153 0.18 0.209 0.232
1 0 0.05 0.089 0.122 0.153 0.18 0.209
2 0 0 0.521 0.414 0.539 0.632 0.705
3 0 0 0 0.229 0.414 0.539 0.632
4 0 0 0 0 0.794 0.595 0.746
5 0 0 0 0 0 0.336 0.595
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.561
On the basis of Akaike and Bayes Information Criteria we include one lag for the baseline
of the DFM.
To get a better understanding of how well the extracted factors characterise the data, Ta-
ble 2 shows the variation in the data explained by the five factors. The second column shows
the fraction of explained variation for a selection of aggregate area-wide series. The third
column shows the corresponding average across series from individual member countries.
In particular, two observations stand out. Firstly, the variation in most aggregate series is
remarkably well explained by the five factors. With a few exceptions, notably the exchange
rate, the R-squared ranges between 70% and 99%. Secondly, despite the granularity of the
individual country series, the factors on average still explain more than half of all variation.
In some cases, such as HICP inflation, government spending and, most notably, long-term
interest rates, they explain considerably more. Columns 4 and 5 show the same information
as column 3, but differentiate between the size of the countries. In particular, we separate
the 5 countries in our sample with the largest economies (by nominal GDP) from the 6 coun-
tries with the smallest economies. As expected, the factors pick up information from the
large economies to a much greater extent than for smaller economies. With the exception of
exports, imports and rents, data from larger economies is consistently explained better by
the factors. This difference is particularly strong for GDP (70% vs. 45%) and unemployment
(68% vs. 36%). As concrete examples of the above, Figure 17 in Appendix E plots fitted
series on the basis of the 5 extracted factors against actual (transformed) series for GDP
and HICP in the euro area, Germany and Luxembourg.
In line with this observation and the test results from Onatski (2009) and (2010), we re-estimate the DFM
with only two factors. We find that all main results of the 5-factor model hold. While the smaller amount
of factors allow for greater precision, the larger amount of factors gives us more explanatory power for the
observable series. We prefer the latter effect over the former and hence select 5 factors for our baseline
specification.
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Table 2: R-squared for regression of data series on five principal components. *Germany,
France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands. **Belgium, Austria, Ireland, Finland, Portugal, Luxem-
bourg.
EA
aggregate
Average across
individual
country series
Average across
large* countries
Average across
small** countries
Gross Domestic Product 0.85 0.56 0.70 0.45
Harmonised Index of
Consumer Prices
0.81 0.64 0.71 0.59
House Prices 0.71 0.46 0.52 0.40
Exports 0.76 0.54 0.49 0.58
Imports 0.75 0.58 0.45 0.69
Government Spending 0.18 0.68 0.77 0.59
Gross Fixed
Capital Formation
0.76 0.33 0.51 0.19
Consumption 0.61 0.30 0.34 0.27
Unemployment 0.72 0.51 0.68 0.36
Long-term Rates 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98
Rents 0.41 0.35 0.32 0.38
Share Prices 0.65 0.58 0.59 0.57
Producer Prices in Industry 0.87 - - -
Wages 0.75 - - -
Employment 0.74 - - -
GER 2Y yield 0.98 - - -
Cost of Borrowing indicator 0.91 - - -
EONIA 0.99 - - -
Nominal Effective
Exchange Rate
0.12 - - -
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3 Empirical Results
This section gives an overview of our empirical findings, starting at the euro area aggregate
level and subsequently exploring results on the country level.
3.1 Euro-wide Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy
We start our description of the results with an overview of a selection of aggregate series
across the euro area. Figure 4 shows percentage responses to a contractionary monetary
policy shock of 25 basis points (bp). As discussed in Section 2.3, the external instrument
approach identifies the shock only up to sign and scale. Using the response of EONIA as
a policy indicator, we scale the system to a 25bp contraction in EONIA. The shaded area
around the point estimates signify confidence intervals of one standard deviation, obtained
from a wild bootstrapping procedure with a simple (Rademacher) distribution. Given a
strong instrument, the confidence intervals obtained under this approach are valid despite
the presence of heterogeneity. Because both stages of the regression are incorporated in the
bootstrapping procedure, the error from the external instrument regression is accounted for.
A similar approach has been followed by Mertens and Ravn (2013) and Gertler and Karadi
(2015).
Notably, our results do not suffer from the prize puzzle—the occurrence of rising prices
in reaction to a contractionary monetary policy shock. In fact, while the harmonised index
of consumer prices (HICP) does not have any significant reaction, our producer prices fall
significantly, in line with economic theory. Given the longstanding struggle of VAR-type
models to get rid of the price puzzle, we interpret these findings as an indication of the ability
of the model to accurately characterise economic dynamics. In particular, we attribute the
non-existence of the price puzzle to the combination of correctly capturing information about
prices in the economy (via the DFM) and precisely identifying monetary policy shocks (via
the high frequency instrument).16 The remainder of the series in Figure 4 also behave as
suggested by theory. GDP contracts overall, as do all components with the exception of
Government Spending, which increases in reaction to a contractionary shock. In line with
theory, investment (GFCF) is a lot more volatile than consumption, as are imports and
exports. The reaction of the German 2-year sovereign yield closely follows EONIA. The
aggregate indicator for mortgage interest rates in the euro area as compiled by the ECB also
rises in reaction to a shock, but displays imperfect pass-through as a significant number of
mortgages are characterised by fixed rates that do not adapt to changes in policy. In the
16We also applied the FAVAR approach proposed by Bernanke et al. (2005) using EONIA as the only
observable factor and found that the price puzzle was still present
18
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labour market, unemployment rises, while wages fall. Interestingly, the reaction in wages is
not significant, hinting at a large degree of nominal wage stickiness. In the housing market,
house prices fall significantly after a contraction, following economic theory that higher policy
rates make mortgages more expensive and consequently suppress demand for houses. Rents,
on the other hand, increase in reaction to a shock. Recent research (see e.g. Duarte and
Dias, 2016) suggests that a worsening of conditions in the mortgage market leads agents to
substitute house purchase with renting, thus exerting pressure on rental prices. Motivated
by this result, Section 4 will take a closer look at the housing markets in the euro area and
explore potential avenues for connecting the results to economic theory.
3.2 Cross-Country Dynamic Effects of Monetary Policy
Moving on to results at the country level, we start to uncover the full potential of the
DFM when it comes to providing results for a large number of series. Of the 342 individual
country series in our data set, we have selected a representative sub-sample for Figures 5-7.
In particular, this section takes a closer look at the responses of GDP, the components of
GDP, interest rates, equities, housing prices and housing rents. We point out, however, that
the model produces impulse response functions for all series in our sample.
Figure 5 shows responses for real GDP and HICP across the 11 euro area countries in our
sample. While we omitted error bands for ease of presentation, it is noteworthy that reactions
of GDP across countries are significantly heterogeneous. At one end of the spectrum, the
reaction of Irish GDP clearly differs from the five countries with the weakest reaction. That
said, even the reactions of Finland and Luxembourg are statistically different from France
and Spain, having non-overlapping confidence intervals from the 10th step onward. This
heterogeneity is in itself noteworthy, but also raises the question which parts of the economy
are particularly prone to asymmetric reactions.
For a first pass at this question, Figure 6 contains the reactions of the components
of GDP. A look at the IRFs offers two main conclusions. Firstly, some series, such as
private consumption and gross fixed capital formation tend to move in the same direction, or
with similar patterns, despite heterogeneity across countries. This compares to series such
as government spending and net exports, which in some instances even move in opposite
directions. In part, these differences in the general nature of responses can be explained by
the determinants of the individual series. Government spending, for example, is notoriously
idiosyncratic, varying in degrees of pro- and countercyclicality both across countries as well
as within a country over time.
Secondly, we observe that even among series where responses across countries move in
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Figure 5: Percentage responses of real GDP to a 25bp contractionary policy shock across euro
area member countries.
the same direction, large degrees of heterogeneity exist. In particular, we point out the dis-
parity in reactions of private consumption. While German private consumption drops by a
maximum of about 0.02 percentage points, the drop in Ireland is more than 20 times as large
at 0.4 percentage points. Aside from Ireland, which could be classified an outlier, countries
such as Italy, Finland, Spain and Portugal exhibit drops in consumption that are roughly 10
times the size of the reaction in Germany. One of the core questions we ask in Section 4 is
what may be the cause of this degree of heterogeneity.
Taking a closer look at responses of other variables of interest, we find that the degree
of heterogeneity in responses seems to be closely (and inversely) related to the state of
convergence in a particular market across the euro area. In particular, financial markets
have seen a large degree of convergence,17 which is reflected in the reaction of interest rates
and stock prices across countries. Figure 7 shows that while the immediate impact of a
policy shock on long-term interest rates is not uniform across countries, their reaction over
later periods is almost identical. Similarly, a look at the responses of local equity indices,
displayed in the same figure, reveals a strong degree of homogeneity across equity markets.
17see e.g. ECB (2017).
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Figure 6: Percentage responses of GDP components to a 25bp contractionary policy shock
across euro area member countries.
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Figure 7: Percentage responses of long-term interest rates and local equity indices to a 25bp
contractionary policy shock across euro area member countries. Long-term interest rates are
defined in accordance with OECD methodology, conforming to government bonds of (in most
cases) 10 year maturity.
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policy shock across euro area member countries.
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While stock prices show more differentiated responses than long-term interest rates, the
confidence intervals around stock price IRFs are mostly overlapping.
Among the markets that have seen only very little or no convergence in institutional
characteristics are the labour and housing markets. It is the latter, seen in Figure 8, that
we investigate in more detail in Section 4, thus attempting to clarify the role of institutional
characteristics in shaping channels of the monetary transmission mechanism.18
Table 3: Coefficient of variation of the cross-country responses to a 25bp monetary policy
shock.
Variable
Coefficient
of
Variation
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
On Impact
GDP 1.45 0.70 4.00
Private Consumption 1.19 1.01 2.52
Unemployment Rates 7.16 2.83 25.02
Housing Prices 2.03 1.51 4.57
Housing Rents 3.81 3.15 6.96
HICP 3.24 0.99 13.25
Long-term Interest Rates 0.21 0.14 0.53
Stock Prices 0.37 0.21 0.65
At the 20th Step
GDP 0.64 0.47 0.95
Private Consumption 1.02 0.99 1.11
Unemployment Rates 1.24 0.94 4.22
Housing Prices 1.08 0.84 2.02
Housing Rents 2.41 1.13 8.20
HICP 1.25 0.62 4.05
Long-term Interest Rates 0.46 0.17 1.87
Stock Prices 0.21 0.19 0.26
In the following step, we propose a more rigorous approach to test heterogeneity among
responses. For each set of responses, we calculate the coefficient of variation, i.e. the stan-
dard deviation of responses (among countries) with respect to the EA response of the same
18In Appendix F, we present an alternative way of looking at IRFs across countries to better understand
the statistical significance of our results. Figures 18 and 19 plot the highest and lowest responses, as well as
EA IRFs for various series with their respective confidence intervals. Figure 18 contains these responses for
real variables: GDP, private consumption and unemployment. Figure 19 shows responses for price-related
series: interest rates, HICP and stock prices. Comparing the two groups, we notice that the highest and
lowest responses for none of the real variables are overlapping. In contrast, IRFs are overlapping for most
parts of the price-related series, with only stock prices diverging around the 10th step.
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variable. To make this measure comparable across different types of series, we normalise it by
the size of the EA response. In doing so, we create a numerical measure for the dispersion of
impulse responses that allows for intuitive and meaningful comparison between series. Table
3 presents the coefficients of variation for a selection of variables, both on impact, as well as
at the 20th step. Moreover, the table lists a lower and upper bound for the coefficients of
variation, which we obtain from including the calculation in our bootstrapping procedure.
As can be clearly seen, long-term interest rates and stock prices have a much smaller coeffi-
cient of variation than the other presented variables. At the 20th step, GDP is also markedly
less heterogeneous than other variables such as private consumption.
As some of the intervals around coefficients of variation are overlapping, we also bootstrap
pair-wise differences in the coefficient of variation. The results, presented in Table 4, mostly
confirm earlier observations. Reactions of long-term interest rates (LTINT) and stock prices
(SP) are significantly less dispersed than all other variables. Moreover, at the 20th step,
GDP has a significantly lower coefficient of variation than private consumption (PCON),
unemployment (U), real house prices (RHPI) and real rents (RREN). A few additional
pairwise tests also show significance.
Overall, the findings confirm our earlier statement: The degree of heterogeneity in re-
sponses is lower in financial variables, such as interest rates and stock prices, as well as output,
while it is larger in consumption, consumer prices and variables related to the labour and
housing markets. Importantly, these results open up scope for potentially beneficial policy
intervention. Further institutional convergence might increase the efficiency and precision
of monetary policy, reducing unintended reactions in countries that would otherwise behave
in an idiosyncratic manner. That said, a much deeper understanding of the mechanisms at
play is necessary to justify policy intervention in the first place. By means of a case study,
the following section takes the first step in the direction of improving our understanding for
the example of the housing market.
4 Case-study of Heterogeneous Monetary Policy Trans-
mission in the EA: One Money Market, Many Hous-
ing Markets
The recent literature has emphasized how the transmission of monetary policy operates
through a “housing transmission channel”.19 A focus on this channel is commonly motivated
19Among the various contributions, Iacoviello (2005) and Kaplan et al. (2016) call attention to credit and
liquidity constraints, while the role of rents is studied in Duarte and Dias (2016).
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Table 4: Bootstrapped pair-wise differences in the coefficient of variation of the cross-country
responses to a 25bp monetary policy shock. * marks differences in variation that are significant
at the 68% confidence level. The inference is drawn from a bootstrap procedure.
GDP HICP LTINT SP PCON U RHPI RREN
On Impact
GDP 0 -0.99 1.20* 1.06* 0.16 -5.42* -0.84 -2.15
HICP 0.99 0 3.02* 2.85* 1.69 -3.81 0.66 -0.41
LTINT -1.20* -3.02* 0 -0.13 -0.90* -6.66* -1.79* -3.43*
SP -1.06* -2.85* 0.13 0 -0.84* -6.84* -1.60* -3.32*
PCON -0.16 -1.69 0.90* 0.84* 0 -5.20* -0.75 -2.48*
U 5.42* 3.81 6.66* 6.84* 5.20* 0 5.02 3.46
RHPI 0.84 -0.66 1.79* 1.60* 0.75 -5.02 0 -1.51
RREN 2.15 0.41 3.43* 3.32* 2.48* -3.46 1.51 0
At the 20th Step
GDP 0 -0.55 0.21 0.45* -0.39* -0.59* -0.43* -1.74*
HICP 0.55 0 0.64 1.02* 0.19 -0.18 -0.16 -0.93*
LTINT -0.21 -0.64 0 0.24 -0.60 -0.99* -0.62 -1.65*
SP -0.45* -1.02* -0.24 0 -0.80* -1.04* -0.85* -2.17*
PCON 0.39* -0.19 0.60 0.80* 0 -0.20 0.00 -1.38*
U 0.59* 0.18 0.99 1.04* 0.20 0 0.20 -0.84
RHPI 0.43* 0.16 0.62 0.85* 0.00 -0.20 0 -0.66
RREN 1.74* 0.93* 1.65* 2.17* 1.38* 0.84 0.66 0
by noting that for most households, the single most important item on the asset side of their
balance sheet is their home. In the form of the mortgage, it typically corresponds to a
household’s largest liability. In this section, we employ our dynamic factor model for the
euro area to investigate the housing channel in more detail. Concretely, we will make use
of the European setting to explore how various details of the housing channel shape the
transmission of monetary shocks.
A remarkable feature of European housing markets are their substantial differences in
institutional characteristics. Mortgage markets differ markedly in the relative share of fixed
versus flexible rate contracts and maximum loan-to-value ratios, rental markets are subject
to different regimes and controls, and property taxation is very heterogeneous, to name
but a few aspects—see Osborne (2005), Andrews et al. (2011) and Westig and Bertalot
(2016) for a comprehensive overview. Indeed, the effect of institutional characteristics on
the transmission of monetary policy has previously been explored by Calza et al. (2013),
who however focus mostly on housing finance.
Our point of departure is the idea that the transmission of monetary policy should be
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Figure 9: Correlation of house price response troughs and rent response peaks with home
ownership rates. Figures exclude Ireland and Portugal.
stronger in an environment where rents and house prices move more in response to a shock.
This—as we explain below—may occur where home ownership rates are high.
To bring this idea to the data, we use our dynamic factor model to trace out the trans-
mission of a monetary policy shock through house prices and rents, as well as mortgage rates
and cost of finance, with the goal of shedding light on each constituent component of the
housing channel.
Figure 8 shows impulse response functions for house prices and rents across the euro area.
As anticipated, house prices and rents feature a strong degree of heterogeneity, both in a
qualitative as well as quantitative sense. In particular, we note that while the majority of
house prices fall in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock, rents in fact rise in
most countries. This is also reflected in the aggregate responses of euro area house prices
and rents as seen in Figure 4. This dichotomy may seem counterintuitive when looking at
rents and house prices from an asset pricing perspective: House prices should reflect the
discounted sum of expected future rents, leading to parallel movements in both. While an
asset pricing approach is helpful in explaining price developments when housing takes on
the role of an investment good, it neglects particularities of housing as a consumption good.
When an interest rate shock hits the housing market, mortgages become more expensive,
which consequently leads to a fall in the demand for houses and hence their price. As
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Figure 10: Correlation of house price response troughs and rent response peaks with private
consumption response troughs. Figures exclude Ireland and Portugal.
highlighted in the recent literature,20 when faced with more expensive mortgages, home
buyers, at the margin, not only scale down the size of their mortgage (and house), but
also substitute buying a house with renting. In doing so, demand for rental properties goes
up, leading to an increase in rents. In line with our hypothesis above, the ability of a rental
market to absorb the mass of agents that switch from buying to renting may be closely linked
to the size of the rental market or, inversely, to the home ownership rate of a country. To
get a better understanding of the importance of the home ownership rate in the transmission
channel, in Figure 9 we plot the maximum response of each country’s house price and rent
IRF against the home ownership rate. Seeing that the responses of Ireland and Portugal are
highly idiosyncratic, we treat them as outliers at this stage and do not include them in the
scatter plots. Note that the correlation of consumption to rents is weakened by the inclusion
of Ireland and Portugal, while all other correlations are strengthened by their inclusion.
Before analysing the scatter plots in detail, a note of caution regarding their interpretation
is in order. With only 9 data points, our plots are meant to motivate and inform a structured
approach to the monetary transmission channel—to be pursued in future research—rather
than uncovering statistically significant relationships.
The right panel of Figure 9 plots the peak of rent responses against home ownership
20See Duarte and Dias (2016).
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Figure 11: Correlation of private consumption and GDP response troughs with home owner-
ship rates. Figures exclude Ireland and Portugal.
rates. The correlation is positive: The higher the home ownership rate, the larger the
increase in rents. As indicated above, this finding is in line with the idea that housing is
not only an asset, but also a consumption good. To gain insight on how this matters for
monetary policy, observe that, if a shock reduces the demand for housing, so that households
switch to renting, the vacancy rate in the housing stock for sale temporarily increases—since
conversions between homes for sale and homes for renting are limited. Correspondingly, the
pressure on the rental market builds up. Indeed, in countries where the rental market is
insufficiently deep, as may be the case when the market is small (i.e., the ownership rate is
high), everything else equal, new entrants will exert a greater upward pressure on prices. In
the euro area, there are strong cross-border differences in this respect. In Germany, a deep
rental market can easily absorb substantial movements at the extensive margin, with agents
switching from buying to renting or vice-versa, without experiencing significant variations
in rents. At the other extreme, Spain, Finland or Italy, where rental markets are relatively
small, reflecting a number of institutional constraints, new entrants can lead to substantial
changes in rents.
What remains to be shown is that the rental market actually forms a significant compo-
nent of the housing channel. To address this issue, we plot the trough (minimum) of house
price responses and peak (maximum) of rent responses against the response in private con-
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sumption. As can be seen on the two panels, consumption is strongly linked to both changes
in house prices as well as changes in rents. The link between house prices and consumption
points to a strong wealth effect of monetary policy, stressed by Mian et al. (2013) among
others. The larger the drop in house prices, the stronger the direct impact on households’
balance sheets, leading to a cut in consumption. Looking at rents, on the other hand, we see
a strong negative relationship. Households who pay rent are, on average, less wealthy than
households who receive rents, i.e. owners of rental properties. Given a marginal propensity
to consume that is decreasing in wealth, this implies that, after an increase in rents, renters
as a group cut consumption by a larger amount than landlords increase their consumption,
leading to a negative demand shock overall. Moreover, it is plausible that, after a con-
tractionary policy shock (associated with an increase in rents), more renters may become
liquidity and credit constrained, causing them to reduce consumption more sharply than im-
plied by any temporary drop in income. In summary, our results suggests that the housing
channel should be investigated in its multiple components, including house prices and rents.
The importance of these components in turn depends on institutional characteristics, such
as the home ownership rate, which is plausibly related to housing finance.
Having traced the effect of the home-ownership rate to consumption through house prices
and rents, as a last step we investigate whether we can make out a direct relationship be-
tween the home ownership rate and changes in consumption. Figure 10 plots the trough
of private consumption responses against home ownership rates. The figure uncovers a sur-
prisingly clear correlation. This result foreshadows large potential benefit from a systematic
analysis of institutional characteristics in relation to the monetary transmission mechanism,
in particular in a heterogeneous environment such as the EA. At the same time, it lends
support to models stressing the housing channel.
5 Conclusion
Using a dynamic factor model with high frequency identification, this paper investigated the
heterogeneous effects of monetary policy across the euro area. In doing so, we contribute to
the literature by creating an external instrument for monetary policy identification and, by
means of a case study on housing, presented a novel way of uncovering heterogeneity in the
monetary transmission mechanism. The analysis has produced three main results.
Monetary policy transmission in the euro area appears to be persistently heterogenous
across member countries. In this paper, we provided evidence consistent with the idea that
the degree of heterogeneity is inversely related to the degree of cross-border institutional
convergence. While country-level financial variables and output react fairly similarly to the
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same monetary policy shock, variables naturally related to markets that have seen little
convergence, such as housing and labour markets, react in significantly asymmetric ways.
We elaborate on this point with a case study of European housing markets. We show that
differences in the home ownership rate—an indicator reflecting many dimensions in which
national housing markets differ from each other—is strongly correlated with the strength
of monetary policy transmission across countries. Moreover, we show the importance of
looking at the different components of the housing channel, including rents, in addition to
house prices. Indeed, our analysis shows that, in most countries, house prices and rents
respond to a contractionary policy shock in different directions, yet both contribute to a fall
in consumption.
Our results point to a number of promising directions for future research. Firstly, once
data availability improves, it would be highly interesting to break down our external instru-
ment and uncover not only shocks to general monetary policy, but also to sub-components,
such as monetary policy communications shocks or monetary policy instrument shocks. Sec-
ondly, our case study on the housing market is only of exploratory nature. In addition to
the home ownership rate, many other institutional characteristics merit a closer look: loan-
to-value ratios, aggregate mortgage debt to GDP and ease of credit, to name just a few.
Finally, markets other than the housing market, such as the labour market, can and should
be examined in a similar fashion.
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B Small VAR with High-Frequency Identification
In this section we use our instrument to identify monetary policy shocks in a simple VAR
with three variables: output, consumer prices and a policy indicator. This simpler setting
is useful to test the strength of the external instrument. Estimating a simple VAR for
monthly and quarterly data, we test different instruments and policy indicators. The set of
instruments to be tested comprises 3-month, 6-month and 12-month EONIA futures. The
set of policy indicators is given by EONIA, one-year aggregate EA bond yields, one-year
German government bond yields, as well as two-year German government bond yields. We
use industrial production (IP) as a measure of output for monthly data, and real GDP for
quarterly data. For consumer prices, we use HICP at both frequencies.
The combination of policy indicator and instrument that provides the best instrument
strength is the one selected to report the dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks on
output and consumer prices. For monthly data, the selected instrument is the 3-month
EONIA future and the policy indicator is the two-year German government bond rate, while
for the quarterly data the instrument that works best is the one-year EONIA future and the
policy indicator is the one-year German government bond rate.
In order to compare our identification strategy for the EA with a more standard identi-
fication, we also estimate the impulse-response functions using the Cholesky decomposition
with the following ordering: output, consumer prices and policy indicator. The results with
monthly data are reported in Figure 14. The more traditional approach to identify monetary
policy surprises exhibits both a price puzzle and an output puzzle. Interestingly, when using
our external instrument approach, both puzzles disappear. The external instrument delivers
responses that are more in line with standard economic theory where output falls temporar-
ily and recovers in the medium-run (neutrality), and prices fall. In this specification, the
instrument is weak as its F-test is below 10 which implies the possibility of biased estimates
in a small sample such as ours. However, in the case of a just identified IV, it is possible to
get approximately unbiased (or less biased) estimates even with weak instruments.
Using quarterly data, we get a significantly stronger instrument with a first-stage F-test
of 19.45. Figure 15 shows the same set of variable responses, now using quarterly data.
The Cholseky identification does not feature a price puzzle in this setup. There is, however,
an output puzzle. With the high-frequency identification, on the other hand, we only get
a price puzzle on the contemporaneous response, while there is no output puzzle. The
limitations of an identification strategy based on timing restrictions are further highlighted
at the quarterly frequency as it is hard to argue that consumer prices (collected on a monthly
basis) do not react in the same quarter to monetary policy surprises. If we want to allow
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Figure 14: VAR using monthly data from 2000 to 2016. Here we show the responses to a one
standard deviation shock in the policy indicator, comparing the high-frequency identification
with a Cholesky identification strategy. The dashed lines report the bootstrapped 68% con-
fidence intervals. The Cholesky identification orders the policy indicator last. The F-test for
the first-stage regression on the external instrument is 4.85 and the R2 is 2 percent.
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Figure 15: VAR using quarterly data from 2000 to 2016. Here we show the responses to a one
standard deviation shock in the policy indicator using the high-frequency identification and the
Cholesky identification. The dashed lines report the bootstrapped 68% confidence intervals.
The Cholesky identification orders the policy indicator last. The F-test for the first-stage
regression on the external instrument is 19.45 and the R2 is 22 percent.
prices to respond contemporaneously, we can order consumer prices last (instead of the
monetary policy indicator). However, in this case we also get the undesirable restriction
of not letting monetary policy react to consumer prices contemporaneously. The external
instrument is able circumvent this limitation.
Figure 16 shows the responses when we order the consumer prices last in the Cholesky
decomposition. In this case, consumer prices are allowed to react contemporaneously to
monetary policy shocks. When the consumer price response is not contemporaneously re-
stricted to zero, we find that the price puzzle is present and, contrary to the high-frequency
identification, it lasts for a few quarters after the shock hits the economy.
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Figure 16: VAR using quarterly data from 2000 to 2016. Here we show the responses to
a one standard deviation shock in the policy indicator using high-frequency and Cholesky
identification. The dashed lines report the bootstrapped 68% confidence intervals. Here, the
Cholesky identification orders the consumer prices last. The F-test for the first-stage regression
on the external instrument is 19.45 and the R2 is 22 percent.
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C Data Set
Table 5 contains a complete list of the series in our data set as well as detailed descriptions
and information regarding transformations, geographical coverage and sources. Abbrevia-
tions and codes are laid out in the following:
Transformation code (T)
1 - no transformation
2 - difference in levels
4 - logs
5 - difference in logs
Geography
EA - Euro area
EA12 - Euro area (12 countries)
EA19 - Euro area (19 countries)
EACC - Euro area (changing composition)
EA11 i - 11 individual series for sample countries
Factor analysis (F)
Y - included in data set for principal component analysis
Seasonal adjustment
WDSA - working day and seasonally adjusted
SA - seasonally adjusted
NA - neither working day nor seasonally adjusted
Note: National house price indices have different start dates across countries. They begin
in 2005 Q4 for Spain, 2006 Q2 for France, 2007 Q1 for Luxembourg, 2008 Q1 for Portugal,
2010 Q1 for Italy and Austria, and 2005 Q1 for all other countries. Furthermore, unemploy-
ment data for France between 2000 Q1 and 2005 Q1, as well as Luxembourg between 2000
Q1 and 2003 Q1 is only available annually and has been linearly interpolated to create a
quarterly data series. Thereafter all unemployment data is quarterly. Finally, import and
export data for Germany, Spain and Italy is only available from 2012 Q1 onward.
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D On Interpreting Factors
For Table 6, we regress each transformed data series on one of the 5 factors at a time and
subsequently report the series where these regression resulted in the highest R2. While by
nature principal component analysis does not identify factors economically, the table gives
a rough indication of the information represented by them. On this basis, we suggest the
following tentative interpretation:
Factor 1 is likely to represent prices in the economy. It shows a high correlation with a
variety of price indices, from producer prices to HICP, and explains over half of the variance
in these series. Factor 2 is very closely related to measures of interest rates. This includes
money-market rates, as well as borrowing rates for house purchase. Factors 3 and 4 appear
to contain a substantial amount of information about labour markets, with high correlations
to unit labour cost and unemployment rates. That said, the factors are also closely related
to other variables and an interpretation seem much more contentious than for factors 1 and
2. Factor 5 picks up information from various areas of macroeconomic activity and we do
not believe that a straightforward interpretation of the factor is possible.
On the whole, we can emphasise that factors 1 and 2 seem to represent the economic
concepts of prices and interest rates. More generally, the latter could also be interpreted as
representing financial conditions.
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Table 6: List of series that are best explained by a single extracted factor according to R-
squared of a linear regression of the (transformed) series on the respective factor.
Series R-squared
Factor 1
Producer Prices in Industry 0.67
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 0.56
Industrial Turnover Index, Manufacturing 0.53
Compensation of Employees 0.49
Gross Fixed Capital Formation Price Index 0.48
Factor 2
Cost of Borrowing for Households for House Purchase 0.49
6-month Euribor 0.45
1-year Euribor 0.45
3-month Euribor 0.44
Long-term Interest Rate Belgium 0.43
Factor 3
Government Spending Italy 0.61
Unit Labour Cost Germany 0.61
Government Spending Finland 0.61
Unit Labour Cost Luxembourg 0.60
Unit Labour Cost Italy 0.60
Factor 4
Unemployment Italy 0.63
Unemployment Netherlands 0.49
Real House Prices Ireland 0.44
Unemployment Finland 0.43
Real House Prices France 0.43
Factor 5
Real House Prices Netherlands 0.46
GDP Spain 0.40
Private Consumption Spain 0.33
House Prices Netherlands 0.32
Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Construction 0.32
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E Explanatory Power of Factors
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Figure 17: The figure compares actual (transformed) GDP and HICP data with correspond-
ing fitted series on the basis of 5 extracted factors for the euro area (EA), Germany and
Luxembourg from 2000 Q1 to 2016 Q4. Germany and Luxembourg represent the largest and
smallest economies in our sample euro area, respectively. In DFM terminology, the fitted series
represent the systematic component of the data series, while the actual series also contains an
idiosyncratic component.
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F Highest and lowest responses to monetary policy
shock
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Figure 18: Highest/lowest percentage responses of selected real variables to a 25bp contrac-
tionary policy shock across euro area member countries.
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Figure 19: Highest/lowest percentage responses of selected prices to a 25bp contractionary
policy shock across euro area member countries.
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